Edward. Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer (2002), "Legal Origins," Quarterly Journal
of Economics 117(4): 1193-1230.
There must be a million studies already published on legal origins. For yet
another one to appear on a top economic journal, it'd better
(1) offer a radically new theory, and (2) back it up with solid evidences. GS'
theory is indeed radically new. They argued that the main difference between the
civil and the common law systems was that in the former judges were state employees
whereas in the latter judges were independent juries. All the other differences
between the two systems allegedly came from there. What's the origin of such a
difference? There's a tradeoff: independent juries were less biased (in favor of
the king) but might be muzzled by local barons; state-employed judges were more
biased but were also protected by the state from local harrassment.
GS argued that during the 12th and 13th centuries, which they
regarded as the crucial moment for the development of the two systems, England
had a strong central government and was
relatively peaceful, and hence independent juries was the efficient choice;
France had a weak central government and was more chaotic, and hence judges were
state-employed. (The "weaker" the central government was, the more it went out
on a
limb to protect judges against
"strong" local barons... sort of make your head spin, right?)
Interesting theory. Did they back it up with solid evidences?
First of all, the timing doesn't look right. Before the
revolution, judges in France were probably as much captives of local barons as GS
could imagine. "[J]udicial offices were regarded as property that one could buy,
sell, and leave to one's heir on one's death. Montesquieu himself inherited such an
office, held it for a decade, and sold it. The judges were an aristocratic group
who supported the landed aristocracy [...] against the centralized governmental
power in Paris. [...] [E]fforts by the Crown to unify the kingdom and to enforce
relatively enlightened and progressive legislative reforms had frequently been
frustrated. The courts refused to apply the new laws, interpreted them contrary to
their intent, or hindered the attempts of officials to administer them. [...]
[I]t was not unusual for continental judges to act much like their English
counterparts. [...] [T]hey were interpreting creatively, building a common law
that was a rival to the law of the central government in Paris and even developing
their own doctrine of stare decisis." (Merrymen, The Civil Law
Tradition,
1985) So much for state protection from local harrassment - and where was
the alleged king-bias?
Second of all, codification of law, which GS regarded as a control device
necessary only when judges were state-employed and hence happened only in civil-law
countries, actually happened when the central governments were strong (and hence
presumably the tradeoff should go in favor of independent juries) rather than when
they were weak. This is true for both of the most important codifications in
history: Corpus Juris Civilis
and Code Napoleon. The history of the Roman Empire is especially illuminating.
While GS would have predicted that its legal system would be closer to that of
England, in fact "the adjudication of disputes fell more and more into the hands of
public officials who were also learned in the law, but [whose] principal function
was clearly understood to be that of applying the emperor's will. The judge had no
inherent lawmaking power." (Merrymen, The Civil Law Tradition, 1985) I don't want to be too harsh on GS. Legal systems are to certain extent
deliberate
designs by political elites, especially after a revolution.
GS' theory might work better if they were talking
about how the post-revolution system was in reaction to (the memory of) the
pre-revolution horror. But, even if we try to save GS' theory in that way, the
focus should be on why judges have a much smaller role in the civil law
system, instead of on why judges are state-employed.
(September 2004) Edward Glaeser, Simon Johnson, and Andrei Shleifer (2001), "Coase vs.
the Coasians," Quarterly Journal of Economics 116(3):
853-899. There are actually two seperate issues clumsily mixed together by these
(apparently confused) authors. The first is whether it is desirable to
regulate private contracts. The second is, provided some regulations are
indeed desirable, whether a judge or a regulator will be a better enforcer of
those regulations. Although the title of this paper misleadingly suggested
that they're to focus on the first issue, what they studied was actually the
second one. They regarded the main difference between a judge and a regulator
as that the former was neutral whereas the latter was zealous. When enforcing
regulations is costly, sometimes a zealous enforcer can do a better job.
They then used Poland and the Czech Republic to support their claim.
Roughly speaking, Poland uses an SEC to regulate private financial
contracts and thrives, whereas the Czech Republic uses judges
and sucks. The latter suffers from poor corporate governance, where firm
managers steal and tunnel assets at the expense of investors, which in turn
results in its under-developed financial market.
Nice facts to know, but these facts are more relevant to issue #2.
The paper never addresses issue #1: why regulations
are desirable in the first place. To put it differently: why can't the Czech
Republic firms and investors learn to sign more sensible contracts?
The closest the paper got in answering this question is the following
paragraph on p.893, which is evasive to say the least: "[More sensible]
contracts bonding firms to treat investors well did not materialize. The
survival of the theft-proof firms is not an efficient mechanism of
economic selection. The most efficient firms might be the most attractive
to tunnel, making them the least rather than the most likely to survive."
Anyone understands what the heck they were talking about please help
me.
(July 2004)